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As part of a growing phenomenon, patent holders are
increasingly making voluntary, public commitments to limit their
patent’s enforcement and other exploitation. While most of these
commitments are FRAND commitments, in which patent holders
promise to license their patents to manufacturers of standardized
products on terms that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” a growing number of voluntary patent pledges
are made outside the scope of standard-setting organizations or
contexts. All of these voluntary public pledges seek to provide
some degree of assurance that users of the pledged patents will not
face patent litigation suits. However, the exact degree of assurance
depends on the legal theory applied to patent pledges. The
following article offers an overview of legal considerations for
voluntary patent pledges, which go beyond FRAND commitments.
These voluntary patent pledges have neither been tested in court
nor examined in great detail yet. The goal of this article is to
provide an overview of legal arguments based on United States
and German law for those who are considering the use and
reliance on of voluntary patent pledges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Growing commercial competition between technology
companies has created a new focus on obtaining and enforcing
patent portfolios. In the majority of cases, patents are still used in
the “traditional” way by prohibiting competitors from using the
technology; commercially licensing patents against often costly
fees; or as a part of defensive portfolios that are only used in case
of a patent assertion by competitors. However, in recent years
more and more patent holders are applying alternative strategies.
Above all, patent holders are making public promises to refrain
from asserting patents against open source code or other
technologies, to refrain from seeking remedies such as injunctive
relief, or to abstain from transferring patents to non-practicing
entities.1 These voluntary public promises constantly grow in
popularity, especially in large and heavily litigated sectors of the
global technology marketplace, and are often referred to as “patent
pledges.”2 With the rise of these alternative uses of patents, the
questions that must be asked are how to qualify and how to enforce
voluntary patent pledges in an international context.
A. Voluntary Patent Pledges (VPPs)
Voluntary patent pledges (“VPPs”) are characterized as public
announcements, which can be made in a variety of different
settings and formats including website postings, press releases, or
even public speeches.3 As such, they are intended to address the
public rather than one or more specific addressees.
Individuals and companies who take advantage of these
pledges by using and investing in the covered patents rely on the
pledges being binding and enforceable. However, legal
qualification of voluntary patent pledges is ambiguous and almost
unpredictable. To date, none of the currently known patent pledges
1

See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments
and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 479 (2015).
2
For a comprehensive overview of patent pledges, see generally Jorge
Contreras, Non-SDO Patent Statements & Commitments, PROGRAM ON
INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 11, 2015),
http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/.
3
See id.
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have been tested in court. While some commentators have looked
into Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”)
commitments, which are made within the context of Standards
Development Organizations (“SDOs”),4 much less legal analysis is
available with regards to voluntary patent pledges.
This Article aims to provide further thoughts on pressing legal
questions with a special focus on voluntary patent pledges. While
litigants and courts have often described FRAND commitments as
contractual,5 it remains questionable whether VPPs can be
qualified as contracts and what alternative legal theories can be
applied, such as the general principles of promissory estoppel.6
Depending on the legal theory applied to patent pledges,
significantly different legal consequences will arise. Thus, careful
drafting and deliberate legal language is required to accurately
reflect the intention of the respective pledgor and to also respect
the interests and expectations of the pledge recipient.
B. Different Types of VPPs
As a general distinction, two different types of VPPs are
currently dominating the market: generic and almost standardized
VPPs, which are signed by various different companies, and
individually drafted VPPs, which are used by specific companies.7
The difference is of interest since it shows the variety of VPPs
currently in use.
1. General or Standard VPPs
One prominent example of a voluntary patent pledge used by
several different companies is “The Patent Pledge,” which
promises “no first use of software patents against companies with
less than 25 people.”8 A total of thirty-three different companies
have signed the pledge, mostly coming from the start-up scene.9
4

Contreras, supra note 1, at 480.
Id. at 481–82.
6
See infra Part III.A.1.
7
For examples of modern non-SDO VPPs, see Contreras, supra note 2.
8
THE PATENT PLEDGE, http://www.thepatentpledge.org (last visited Jan. 24,
2016).
9
Id.
5
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Similarly, the Eco-Patent Commons project requires participating
companies to:
irrevocably . . . pledge and covenant . . . that we will not assert any of
our listed patents (including any worldwide counterparts) against you
for any infringing machine, manufacture, process, or composition of
matter claimed in such listed patent(s) where such infringing item alone
(or when included in a product or service) reduces/eliminates natural
resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste generation or
pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).10

Current members of the Eco-Patent Commons include
prominent names, such as Bosch, IBM, Nokia, and Sony.11 Finally,
and as further examples of generic VPPs, the Open Web
Foundation Contributor License Agreement and Open Web
Foundation Agreement both use a standardized language to
promise not to assert patent rights,12 and the Standardized
Contributor Agreements available at contributoragreements.org
offer a patent pledge option as an alternative to the traditional
patent license commonly used in contributor agreements. While
“The Patent Pledge” is explicitly drafted as “not legally binding,”13
the Eco-Patent Commons pledge, the Open Web Foundation’s
pledges, and the Standardized Contributor Agreements are written
to be legally binding.14
2. Individual VPPs
Individual VPPs are drafted for, and used by, specific
companies, often with a special focus on Free and Open Source
Software (“FOSS”) development and use. A well-known example
10

ECO-PATENT COMMONS, Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting
Additional Patents to the Commons 3, http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/
default/files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
11
Members, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org/members
(last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
12
The OWF 1.0 Agreements – Granted Claims, OPEN WEB FOUNDATION,
http://www.openwebfoundation.org/legal/the-owf-1-0-agreements (last visited
Jan. 24, 2016).
13
Paul Graham, The Patent Pledge, PAULGRAHAM.COM (August 2011),
http://paulgraham.com/patentpledge.html.
14
See, e.g., The OWF 1.0 Agreements – Granted Claims, OPEN WEB
FOUNDATION, http://www.openwebfoundation.org/legal/the-owf-1-0-agreements
(last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (“[T]his promise is intended to be binding.”).
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is Google’s “Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge,” which was
launched in 201315 and covers a list of specifically identified and
pledged patents published on Google’s website.16 However,
Google was not the first company to make such a voluntary public
commitment. IBM already committed not to assert any of the 500
patents made available on their website in 2005;17 Twitter
introduced the “Innovator’s Patent Agreement” in 201218 and Red
Hat made a public promise to refrain from enforcing an infringed
patent they held if that patent is exercised by any third party with
respect to Free and Open Source Software.19 Most recently, a great
deal of attention was paid to Tesla’s announcement that “[a]ll our
patents belong to you.”20
Since all of these voluntary patent pledges were originally
designed and drafted to accommodate a specific situation and a
specific company’s need, the language and exact wording of each
pledge differ significantly, which makes a general assessment of
patent pledges nearly impossible.21 However, a few commonalities
and comparable legal aspects can be found, based on which

15

Google’s Promise Not To Assert 10 Patents Against Open Source Software:
Just
A
PR
Stunt,
FOSS
PATENTS
(March
28,
2013),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/googles-promise-not-to-assert-10.html.
16
Pledged
Patents,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/patents/
opnpledge/patents/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
17
See IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2016); see also Legally Binding Commitment Not to Assert Nokia Patents
against
the
Linux
Kernel,
NOKIA,
http://web.archive.org/web/
20051229190243/http://www.nokia.com/iprstatements (last visited Jan. 24,
2016) (stating Nokia’s commitment not to assert Nokia patents against the Linux
Kernel) (archived from original source).
18
Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement, TWITTER
(April 17, 2012), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patentagreement.
19
Statement of Position and Our Promise on Software Patents, RED HAT,
http://www.redhat.com/legal/patent_policy.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
20
Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA MOTORS (June 12,
2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
21
However, most of these patent pledges are licensed under a Creative
Commons license and can therefore be shared and used by everyone interested.
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different drafting opportunities can help to address different
motivations and strategic goals.
C. Interests and Motivations
Despite initial concerns and doubts, FOSS has gained ground
and become one of the most successful developments over the past
years. The core idea of FOSS is to make software available, with
source code, to everyone.22 A broad range of user’s rights are
licensed free of charge and all users benefit from further
developments made precisely because these changes themselves
are in turn made available free of charge.23 In addition to the wellknown role of intellectual property rights in stimulating
investments, a variety of other factors play an increasingly
important role in software innovation, including using many eyes
to reduce and quickly address bugs, cost sharing synergies, or ease
of customization. Based on this strategy, the software sector is
enjoying enormous growth in free and open source based
innovation. Not only are most patent pledges available today made
in the context of software development, but there is also a
“philosophical” link between the increasing phenomenon of patent
pledges and the success of Free and Open Source Software
licenses. Pledgor and licensor are not focusing on immediate
commercial return for their inventions or creations; rather, they
encourage a broad availability of common technology platforms in
order to enable long term and market-wide cost savings and
efficiencies.24 This becomes especially clear when looking at
Tesla’s promise not to enforce any patents.25 Criticized by some as

22

See TILL JAEGER & AXEL METZGER, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1–2 (3d ed.,
Beck CH 2011).
23
Till Jaeger & Axel Metzger, Open Source Software and German Copyright
Law, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 52, 55 (2001).
23
Till Jaeger & Axel Metzger, Open Source Software and German Copyright
Law, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 52, 55 (2001).
24
Dirk Riehle, The Economic Case for Open Source Foundations,
COMPUTER, Jan. 2010, 93, 93.
25
Musk, supra note 20.
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a marketing tool, Tesla’s pledge may indeed lead to robust new
markets for battery technology.26
1. Benefits to the Patent Holder
One of the rationales behind patent pledges is the incentive for
other market participants to make investments in the covered
technology platform. Possible investments include contractual
commitments, purchase of durable goods and capital equipment,
employee training, development or procurement of information
technology, identifying and contracting suppliers, and building
customer relationships.27 Because most of these investments make
it more difficult to switch to an alternative technology later on,
they can easily lead to a lock-in effect for market participants and
give patent holders a much better position in subsequent license
negotiations.28
On a more general level, patent pledges are intended to create
network effects. Since they are designed to provide assurance to
the market rather than to specific firms, they give certainty and
confidence that the pledgor’s patent will not be used to block the
adoption of a standard or other common technology platform. This
in turn can encourage additional companies to rely on these
platforms and focus on interoperability standards, which enable
further development of different products and services built upon
26

See Phil McKenna, Why Tesla Wants to Sell a Battery for Your Home, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 1, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/537056/
why-tesla-wants-to-sell-a-battery-for-your-home/. As Professor Adam Mossoff
has pointed out, “Tesla’s new policy is an example of Musk exercising patent
rights, not abandoning them.” Adam Mossoff, Teslas’s New Patent Policy: Long
Live the Patent System!, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2014/08/13/teslass-new-patent-policy-long-live-the
-patent-system/. Similarly, Professor Mark Lemley told VentureBeat, “Tesla
recognizes that it is trying to build a network, and if it can get more people to
invest in electric car technology, it will benefit even as others benefit too.” Eric
Blattberg, Here’s What Tesla’s ‘Good Faith’ Patent Stance Actually Means,
VENTUREBEAT
(June,
14,
2014,
9:57
AM),
http://venturebeat.com/2014/06/14/heres-what-teslas-good-faith-patent-stanceactually-means/.
27
Contreras, supra note 1, at 6.
28
See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007).
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these standards.29 Such network effects are especially promising
since pledged patents are still valuable for patent holders. Instead
of transferring patents, ownership of the patents remains with the
pledgor, but subjects them to a promise governing how the patent
holder will or will not enforce the patents in the future. Most patent
pledges include a termination clause with respect to any user of the
pledged patents who aggressively files legal proceedings for patent
infringement against the patent owner or holder.30
Finally, VPPs may be used as a marketing tool to reflect the
innovation potential of a company. Patents are not only used to
exclude competitors from the use of a certain technology, they are
also used as a means of communication to potential investors and
other market actors. From this perspective, a patent pledge may be
used to amplify the “signaling effects”31 of a strong patent
portfolio. Today, many patents are stacked in defensive patent
portfolios and are enforced only in the case of a legal action being
brought by a competitor.32 Using a VPP favoring FOSS projects

29

Public benefits of technical standards have been recognized widely by
different commentators and explained in a report by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) as “one of the engines of modern economy.” U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation And Competition 33 (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompet
itionrpt0704.pdf.
30
Google’s language contains the right to “terminate the Pledge, to the extent
Google deems necessary to protect itself, its affiliates, or its products and services
(“Defensive Termination”) with respect to any Pledge Recipient (or affiliate) who
files a lawsuit or other legal proceeding for patent infringement or who has a
direct financial interest in such lawsuit or other legal proceeding (an “Asserting
Party”) against Google or any entity controlled by Google or against any third
party based in whole or in part on any product or service developed by or on
behalf of Google or any entity controlled by Google.” GOOGLE, Open Patent
Non-Assertion Pledge, https://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge/ (last
visited Jan. 25, 2016).
31
See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHIC. L. REV. 625, 656 (2002).
32
See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The
Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction
Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2012).
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does not reduce the defensive vigor of a patent portfolio, but
maximizes the signaling effect.33
2. Benefits to the Addressee / Pledge Recipient
Individuals and companies who take advantage of the pledged
patents do so to further innovate and develop their own products.
Increased access to technology enables them to constantly keep
pace with demand in the market and strengthen customer
relationships. The benefits to the addressee of pledges are selfevident: they can use technology provided by the patent holder
without having to pay license fees.
3. Benefits to Society at Large
Technical standards make products less costly for firms to
produce and more valuable to consumers.34 Likewise, patent
pledges enable market participants to make investments in reliance
that the eventually manufactured products and related sales will
not be blocked by the patent holder. In turn, this encourages the
development of improved products and services built upon access
to technology. In this context, legal certainty and especially
enforceability of patent pledges will help spur innovation and
prevent social waste. In addition, patent pledges foster competition
on the markets for products and services based on the patent
protected technology.
D. A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and German Law
At first glance, voluntary patent pledges seem to be a United
States (“U.S.”) phenomenon. However, since Germany has turned
out to be the favorite battle ground for patent litigation in Europe,35
the question of whether voluntary patent pledges are legally
binding and enforceable under German law will undoubtedly
become relevant. In addition, Germany has been a forerunner in
33

Empirical data of what patents are pledged by major companies is not
available. However, one may assume that companies do not use VPPs for their
blockbuster patents.
34
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , supra note 29.
35
See CREMERS ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, (ZEW 2013),
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13072.pdf.
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enforcement of FOSS licenses.36 Consequently, it is likely that
voluntary patent pledges announced in the context of FOSS will be
tested in German courts.
Another aspect that makes a comparative analysis of U.S. and
German law with regards to patent pledges relevant is the
difference between U.S. and German contract law.37 In particular,
the requirements to form a binding contract under German law are
less restrictive compared to the contract doctrine in U.S. and other
common law jurisdictions.38 In practice, this means that patent
pledges that do not qualify as binding contracts under U.S. law
may still be considered a binding contract under German law. The
different legal consequences may lead to unwanted results, which
cannot always be avoided by adding a choice-of-law clause. A
patent pledgor may only choose the applicable law with regard to
those questions that may be characterized as contractual according
to German and European principles of conflict of laws.39 The same
principles apply to unilateral acts like waiver, consent or
comparable dispositions. A choice of law clause may thus
determine the applicable law for questions such as offer,
acceptance and consideration, interpretation of contracts, warranty
and liability etc., of a VPP. However, the proprietary aspects of
license contracts or unilateral dispositions on intellectual property
rights are subject to the principle of territoriality and covered by
the law of the country for which protection is sought.40 Typical
proprietary aspects are questions like ownership and transferability
of intellectual property rights and licenses, requirements and
consequences for exhaustion, or in rem-effects of licenses against
36

Judgements, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL QUESTIONS ON FREE AND OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE, http://www.ifross.org/en/v-judgements (last visited Jan. 25,
2016).
37
See infra Part II.B (noting German contract law doesn’t require any kind of
“consideration”).
38
Andres Guadamuz & Andrew Rens, Comparative Analysis of Copyright
Assignment and Licence Formalities For Open Source Contributor Agreements,
10:2 SCRIPTED 207 (2013), http://script-ed.org/?p=1065.
39
See Regulation 593/2008, Art. 3(12) (Rome I).
40
See EUROPEAN MAX PLANK GROUP, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Art. 3:301 (2013).
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third parties.41 As a consequence, patent holders using VPPs should
not be surprised if the enforcement of promises made in VPPs take
place in German courts and are governed by German law.
II. VPPS AS (PATENT LICENSE) CONTRACTS?
Voluntary patent pledges are usually not addressed to any
particular individual or company. Instead they are aimed at a
specific market and intended to encourage market participants to
invest in the covered technology.42 However, depending on the
exact language and interpretation of the respective wording,
voluntary patent pledges can be described as contractual.
A. United States Approach
1. Common Law Contract Doctrine
Common law contract doctrine requires different elements for
contracts to be enforceable, such as consideration, offer,
acceptance, and mutual assent.43 At first glance, the interpretive
and normative principles of contract law seem applicable to VPPs,
particularly if the VPPs include certain conditions. The promise
not to enforce respective patents can be interpreted as an offer not
to enforce the patents if specified conditions are accepted, such as
the use of the pledged patents in a particular technological context.
By using the respective patent, the pledge recipient indicates
agreement with the required conditions, which could qualify as
acceptance and mutual assent.44 Since consideration can be
anything ranging from money to physical objects, services,
promised actions, or refraining from a future action;45 the pledgor’s
consideration would be refraining from future enforcement and the
user’s consideration would be compliance with the given
conditions. Therefore, a binding contract between the pledgor and
the user of the respective pledged patents can potentially be
formed.
41

Id.
See supra Part I.B.
43
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
44
Id. at § 50.
45
Id. at § 71.
42
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2. Covenant-Not-To-Sue
Whenever patent pledges can be described as a binding
contract under U.S. law, they may qualify as a covenant-not-tosue. Under U.S. law, covenants-not-to-sue may be characterized as
contracts, as suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 285(1): “A contract not to sue is a contract under which the
obligee of a duty promises never to sue the obligor or a third
person to enforce the duty or not to do so for a limited time.”46 In
fact, some pledges explicitly include the term “covenant;” for
example, the non-assert pledge signed by members of the EcoPatent Commons uses this phrase.47 Others use wording typical for
covenants-not-to-sue, such as “Google will not bring a lawsuit or
other legal proceeding against a Pledge Recipient”48 or “IBM
hereby commits not to assert.”49 As for consideration, and because
it is not obligatory that a sum of money is paid, it may be possible
to create a cross covenant-not-to-sue based on any other valuable
performance or return promise.50
Assuming that a pledge meets the requirements of a binding
covenant-not-to-sue, an infringement action filed by the patent
holder will be dismissed as moot.51 Also, a declaratory judgment
claim for non-infringement lodged by an alleged infringer may be
dismissed; however, a court must still look at all the circumstances
to determine whether there is a substantial controversy that
supports a declaratory judgment action.52 Besides the procedural
consequences, courts have accepted that covenants-not-to-sue do
46

Id. at § 285(1); see also Mathis v. St. Alexis Hosp. Assoc., 99 Ohio App. 3d
159, 161, 650 N.E.2d 141, 143 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994).
47
ECO-PATENT COMMONS, Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or submitting
additional patents to the Commons, http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/
files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
48
Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
49
IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM,
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2016).
50
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
51
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013).
52
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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also imply a substantive authorization to use the patented
technology similar to a non-exclusive license.53 As a consequence,
it may be argued that products manufactured on the basis of a
covenant-not-to-sue are subject to exhaustion and can be sold
without prior authorization of the patent holder.54 Also, a purchaser
of the pledged patent will be bound by all outstanding licenses.55
Moreover, in the event of the insolvency of the patent holder, the
covenant is not dischargeable.56
In short, while a contractual analytical framework may be
suitable for some VPPs, it is unsuitable for many. In practice,
consideration remains the most crucial aspect. Qualification as a
binding contract, and especially the type of contract—specifically
as a covenant-not-to-sue—will depend on the exact wording of the
respective VPP. Since most pledges have a public character and
are intended to offer assurances to the market at large rather than to
reflect bilateral negotiated terms between two private parties, it
will be difficult to apply common law contract doctrine to VPPs
and argue for a covenant-not-to-sue.57 In other words, whenever
the covenant—in the form of a patent pledge—comes as a mere
unilateral promise to behave in a certain way and without any
element of exchange, it will be burdensome for the recipient of the
pledge to plead for the conclusion of a binding covenant and for a
binding contract in general.
3. (Implied) Patent License
Even if VPPs cannot be qualified as binding contracts, and
irrespective of the discussion of whether a license is a contract or
not under U.S. law,58 they may still be considered as licenses. In
53

TransCore v. Electronic Transaction Consultants, 563 F.2d 1271, 1277
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
54
Id. at 1274.
55
Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1921).
The recording requirement of § 261(2) US Patent Act is not applicable to nonexclusive licenses, as visible from the clear wording of the provision (“exclusive
right”). Id.
56
In re Spansion, Inc., 507 Fed.Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
57
Contreras, supra note 1, at 503.
58
See Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GNU GPL, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM
(Sept. 10, 2001), https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/enforcing-gpl.html. The
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1927, the Supreme Court made clear that no formal granting of a
license is necessary in order to give it effect with their decision in
De Forest Radio Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States.59
The court stated:
[a]ny language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his
part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that
the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or
selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a license, and a defense
to an action for a tort.60

A license, according to the Court, passes no interest in the
monopoly, but has been described as a mere waiver of the right to
sue by the patentee.61
A similar line of reasoning can be found in the Third Circuit’s
2009 decision in Transcore vs. Electronic Transaction,62 which
builds upon the principle that the grant of a patent does not provide
the patentee with an affirmative right to practice the patent but
merely the right to exclude.63 Consequently, according to the Third
Circuit, a patentee, by license or otherwise, cannot convey an
affirmative right to practice a patented invention by way of
making, using, selling, etc., the patented invention; the patentee
can only convey a freedom from suit.64 Even more recently, the
Third Circuit agreed that a license is equivalent to a covenant-notto-sue in the bankruptcy context, arguing that the promise “to
dismiss the action against [the defendant], and to not re-file the
ITC action or another action related to one or more of the same
patents against [the defendant]” was a promise “not to sue [the

important difference is that contracts are enforced under contract law, which is
done state by state, and there are certain necessary elements to qualify as a valid
contract. Licenses, instead, are enforced under copyright law at the federal level.
The penalties available are not the same. Id.
59
De Forest Radio Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States, 273 U.S.
236 (1927).
60
Id. at 241.
61
Id. at 242.
62
563 F.3d 1271 (3d Cir. 2009).
63
Id. at 1275 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)).
64
Id.
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defendant] for its use of [the plaintiff’s] patented products” and
therefore a “license.”65
Assuming that future court decisions will follow the arguments
stated by the Supreme Court in 1927 and the Third Circuit and
consequently interpret VPPs as licenses, the exhaustion principle
may apply to the pledged patents and any initial authorized sale of
the patented items will terminate all patent rights to those items.66
Furthermore, if considered a license, any pledge recipient may
elect to retain its rights under section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Act
as if he were a holder of an intellectual property license.67
4. Arguments and Summary
Even though the Supreme Court’s decision in De Forest Radio
Telephone & Telegraph Co v. United States dates back to 1927,
future opinions may find strong arguments for considering a VPP
as a license, which will be difficult to ignore. Because none of the
voluntary patent pledges described above68 have been analyzed and
tested in courts, there is no evidence that patent pledges will be
treated like licenses. In fact, all arguments leading to the
interpretation as a license with all the associated legal
consequences, have to be put in context and include the respective
situation and—more importantly—the exact wording of the
respective agreement in question. Even if there are strong
arguments that courts will consider a covenant-not-to-sue and a
license to be equivalent, there is no guarantee or legal certainty that
voluntary patent pledges would be treated in the same way.
Covenants-not-to-sue and licenses are drafted as bilateral or multilateral agreements.69 Regardless of how many parties are involved
in such agreements, they can always be identified at the time of
conclusion. VPPs, in contrast, are drafted as unilateral promises.
As such, they are not addressed to a specific individual or
company, but to the whole market. Usually, pledging companies
65

In re Spansion, Inc., 507 F. App’x. 125 (3d. Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621, 128 S. Ct.
2109, 2113 (2008).
67
See In re Spansion, Inc., 507 F. App’x 125 (3d. Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
68
See supra Part II.A.
69
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 285 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
66
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do not require anyone to register or sign anything in order to
perfect their rights under the pledge. Consequently, they do not
track or identify pledge recipients. Especially, where patent
pledges are drafted deliberately short and without specified
conditions, they are inclined to show an intention and motivation,
which is different from the traditional way of licensing patents,
including avoidance of all legal consequences. While this
unilateral character may be seen as an argument to differentiate
patent pledges from patent licenses, experience with FOSS and
Creative Commons licenses have shown that licenses, meeting
certain conditions, can be granted to any member of the public
(public licenses),70 which in turn can offer an argument to support
the view of VPPs as being on par with patent licenses and leaves
the discussion and result open.
B. Germany Approach
Freedom of contract (Vertragsfreiheit) is one of the
fundamental rights under German law. As a general principle, and
apart from a few exceptions stated in the German Civil Code,71
contracts can contain whatever provisions the parties agree upon.72
Unlike the U.S. common law contract doctrine, German contract
law does not require consideration.73 However, offer and
acceptance are required to form a binding contract.74
1. German Contract Law
The offer to form a binding contract requires a declaration of
intent (Willenserklaerung) including an intention to be bound

70

See Licenses, GNU OPERATING SYS., https://www.gnu.org/licenses/
licenses.en.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2015); About the Licenses, CREATIVE
COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
71
See, e.g., Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 138 (allowing
legal transaction contrary to moral principles or exploiting the other person due
to undue advantages) (English translation available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html).
72
See id. Furthermore, they do not have to be in any particular form (e.g. in
writing or by registration), unless specifically required by law. Id.
73
Id. §§ 145–51.
74
Id. §§ 145–47.
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(Geschaeftswille).75 Interpretation of both must reflect the
perspective of the addressee, so that the offer has to be interpreted
based on “what the addressee must have understood if observed
objectively.”76 Looking at the experience from FOSS licenses,
which are commonly seen as license agreements between licensor
and licensee, and therefore, as contracts under German law, patent
pledges can be qualified as an offer to form a binding contract if
the respective language shows a clear intention to be legally
bound.77 Consequently, whenever a patent pledge explicitly states
it is not to be legally binding, such as “The Patent Pledge,”78 a
binding contract must be denied. But any patent pledge drafted to
be legally binding may be seen as a valid offer according to
German contract law and any use of the pledged patents may be
seen as an acceptance. Acceptance does not necessarily have to
reach the offeror. Instead, a contract is considered to have come
into effect without communication of acceptance to the offeror, if
such communication is not expected according to ordinary usage
or if the offeror has waived such communication.79 Both
alternatives may apply to patent pledges: the patent owner waives
the communication requirement by relying on the public pledge,
and it is also common practice not to notify the patent owner if the
patent pledge is drafted as a public promise to assure the market
rather than one individual or one particular company.80
However, the fact that patent pledges are not written to address
one particular company poses another question of German private
law. Since patent pledges are formulated for an indefinite number
of users and therefore for an indefinite number of potential
contracts, they may be regarded as standard business terms, which
are subject to additional restrictions as stated in Sections 305–310
75

Id. §§ 116–33, 145.
Id. § 157 (“Verobjektivierter Empfängerhorizont.”).
77
An intention to be legally bound is missing if the offeror only provides
basic information about a specific product and thereby encourages other
interested parties to make an offer, so called “invitatio at offerendum” (e.g.
products shown in shop-windows). Id.
78
Graham, supra note 13.
79
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 151.
80
See TIM ENGELHARDT & TILL JAEGER, THE INTERNATIONAL FREE AND
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LAW BOOK 107 (Open Source Press 2014).
76
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of the German Civil Code.81 These restrictions are supposed to
protect parties and especially consumers when entering contracts
that contain standard business terms.82 As a general rule, standard
business terms can only be legally binding components of a
contract if (1) the user of such terms either explicitly or, where
explicit reference to standard terms is unusually difficult, in
another reasonably noticeable manner, refers to the standard terms,
and thereby gives the other party the opportunity to take notice of
all details of the respective standard terms; and if (2) the other
party agrees with these standard terms.83 In theory, these detailed
requirements may pose a problem for the standard language of
patent pledges to become part of a legally binding contract;
however, in practice, it can be assumed that the user of pledged
patents has taken note of and agreed with all details of the
respective pledge.84 Moreover, most patent pledges are used
between companies, while most German rules on standard business
terms only apply in transactions with consumers.85
In summary, voluntary patent pledges can be constructed as
legally binding contracts under German law if the respective
language shows clear intention to be legally bound.
2. Interpretation of Contracts
To understand the legal consequences, the character of the
contract must be determined, since special contracts are governed
by different principles under German law.86
a. Patent License Contract
One possible interpretation may result in a patent license
contract. The promise not to enforce patents may be seen as the
patent owner’s consent to use the patents. Similar to the arguments
81

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §§ 305–10.
See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 36 (EC).
83
See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 305.
84
See TILL JAEGER & AXEL METZGER, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 164–66 (3rd
ed., Beck CH 2011) for argumentation in the context of FOSS licenses.
85
See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 310(1).
86
See supra note 71 and accompanying text regarding taking into account
good faith and customary practice.
82

502

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 483

found in U.S. case law, German scholars and courts may argue that
patents do not give any positive, exclusive right to use the
respective patent, but only the right to exclude others from using
it.87 Irrespective of the theoretical and doctrinal framework of
patent licenses in the German context, interpretation of contracts
must identify what type of arrangement the parties wanted to
reach. Looking at the exact wording of most of the prominent
patent pledges, the declaration of intent constitutes the “promise
not to bring a lawsuit for patent infringement.”88 Taken literally,
this does not show any desire to sell or license the respective
patent. The promise not to enforce patents—even under certain
conditions—does not even mention any intended transfer of
exclusive or non-exclusive rights, which would be required for a
patent license. From the perspective of customary practice or
“what the addressee must have understood if observed
objectively,”89 it is also clear that neither a transfer of the patent
nor a license can be expected. Only a specific performance can be
anticipated, namely the performance not to enforce the pledged
patents.
Assuming that a patent pledge is still drafted in a way that
suggests interpretation as a patent license contract, any
infringement claim by the patent holder will be denied. Since a
pledge can only be interpreted as a non-exclusive license, the
license grant itself (disposition) will be considered nontransferable under German law if the licensor has not explicitly
agreed to the transfer.90 Such consent can also be given in advance
if clearly stated in the pledge. Similar to the U.S. analysis, the
87

However, the theoretical question of patent licenses and the related
dogmatic fundamentals is not quite clear in Germany. Some scholars argue
against “negative” licenses. See Ronny Hauck, Rechtsnatur und-wirkungen eines
covenant-not-to-sue, 5 ZGE/IPJ 206, 223 (2013) (referencing Case C-533/07,
Falco Privatstiftung v. Weller, 2009 I-03327, GRUR 2009 at 753). Others
explicitly refer to “negative licenses” as one possible way to structure patent
licenses. See MAXIMILIAN HAEDICKE ET AL, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 315
(Beck 2014).
88
See, e.g., Google Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
89
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §157.
90
GEORG BENKARD, PATENTGESETZ 705, § 103 (C.H. Beck 2015).
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exhaustion principle will apply to products using the respective
pledged patents when these products have been put on the market
within the European Union or any European Economic Area
member state.91
b. Covenant-Not-To-Sue
Additional arguments may be drawn from interpreting a
covenant-not-to-sue under German law.92 An agreement stating
that the patent holder will not assert a patent claim against the
other party may either be qualified as a mere procedural contract, a
so called “pactum de non petendo,” or as a substantive contract
which excludes the patent claim and can in turn be treated as a
license grant. The District Court of Mannheim interpreted a
covenant-not-to-sue in a recent case as a mere pactum de non
petendo.93 The controversial settlement agreement combined an
explicit, non-exclusive license for one party with a mere covenantnot-to-sue for the other side. The court inferred from this
difference in wording that the parties would have stipulated an
explicit license for the other side as well if they had wanted to.94 As
a consequence, the covenant-not-to-sue only bound the parties to
the settlement agreement and not, after the patent was transferred,
the transferee, who successfully enforced the patent in court.95
Since it was not qualified as a license contract, any in rem effect
was neglected.
3. Arguments and Summary
Following the analysis offered by the District Court of
Mannheim, it is likely that German courts would qualify patent
pledges as contracts with purely procedural effects where the
courts can find clear indication that the parties explicitly did not
want to enter a license agreement. However, German courts may
also interpret patent pledges as implied patent license contracts
91

See HAEDICKE ET AL, supra note 87, at 804–17.
Under German law, a covenant-not-to-sue must meet the requirements of a
contract to be binding. See Hauck, supra note 87, at 225–26.
93
LG Mannheim [District Court Mannheim], Apr. 23, 2010, 7 O 145/09,
GRUR-RR 2011, 49 (Ger.).
94
Id.
95
Id.
92
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whenever the respective wording shows clear characteristics
comparable to a patent license, but simply avoids the term “patent
license.” In the case of Google’s “Open Patent Non-Assertion
Pledge,”96 the promise not to assert patent claims is embedded into
a broader set of promises and duties, which are typical of license
contracts. It should not only bind Google and its controlled entities
but also their successors and persons or entities to which Google
might transfer the pledged patents.97 The “IBM Statement of NonAssertion of Named Patents Against OSS”98 explicitly states: “[w]e
are pledging the free use of 500 of our U.S. patents as well as all
counterparts of these patents issued in other countries, in the
development, distribution, and use of open source software.”99 This
specific language indicates that the pledge should also imply the
substantive right of the recipient to use the patented inventions and
not just prevent claims on a procedural level.
III. PATENT PLEDGES AND OTHER LEGAL THEORIES
As analyzed above, it is uncertain whether VPPs may be
qualified as contracts under U.S. contract law principles.100
However, even if courts reject the application of contract law
principles, VPPs could still have legal effects for their addressees.
A. United States
1. Promissory Estoppel
It is possible to give VPPs legal effect under U.S. law even if
they do not qualify as contracts. U.S. contract law combines a strict
concept of contract with a more flexible and open doctrine of

96

Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
97
“Google will require any person or entity to whom it sells or transfers any
of the Pledged Patents to agree, in writing, to abide by the Pledge and to place a
similar requirement on any subsequent transferees to do the same.” Id.
98
IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2016).
99
Id.
100
See supra Part II.A.
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promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is
restated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90:
Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance: A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.101

If one follows this approach, a mere promise which does not
result in the conclusion of a contract may still be enforceable.
Different from some stricter case law, the Restatement does not
require a “clear and definite promise”102 or any other heightened
standard of proof for the seriousness of the promise as long as the
statement is not just a mere expression of intention to do or to
forbear something.103 Many of the VPPs analyzed here will meet
these requirements. Public statements like “Tesla will not initiate
patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our
technology”104 or “[n]o first use of software patents against
companies with less than 25 people”105 express the promise of the
patent holder to abstain from any patent enforcement as long as
the–admittedly vague–conditions of the pledges are respected. For
public announcements like “[i]t has never been, nor will it be
Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts
of our patented seed or traits are present in farmer’s fields as a
result of inadvertent means,” it is harder to predict whether a U.S.
judge would interpret the statement as a promise in the sense of
§ 90 or as a mere description of the future patent policy.106

101

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See, e.g., Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Committee v. First Jersey
Nat’l. Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 484, 395 A.2d 222, 233 (1978); Jensen v.
Taco John’s Int’l, Inc., 110 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1997).
103
Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogard, 494 N.E.2d 965, 968–69 (Ind. App.
1986).
104
See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
105
See Graham, supra note 13.
106
In Organic Seed Growers and Trade v. Monsanto Company, the CAFC
applied a theory of judicial estoppel. 718 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
102

506

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 483

Jorge Contreras has pointed to a second source of uncertainty
with regard to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.107 A user of
patented technology may only plead promissory estoppel if he has
actually relied on the concrete patent pledge. The promise must
have induced the user’s application of the patented technology, and
the user bears the burden of proof for his reliance on the promise.
What if the user was not aware of the patent or did not relate his
product or service to the relevant patent claims? What if the user
has purchased products that contain protected technology without
his knowledge? Proving actual reliance may be challenging in such
cases. It is unclear whether the first sale-doctrine will help users
who have bought products manufactured on the basis of
promissory estoppel.
Furthermore, a third and very crucial source of uncertainty
should be emphasized. The promise of the patent holder, which is
the very basis of promissory estoppel, can be revoked at any
moment. Such a revocation may put the user in an uncomfortable
position when he depends on the patent holder’s willingness to
grant a license under reasonable terms. Finally, the user’s situation
is also uncertain if the patent is transferred. It is for good reason
that the U.S. antitrust authorities demanded commitments by
Apple, Google, and Microsoft that ensured the patent pledges of
Nortel and Motorola would be upheld before investigations were
closed.108 Without such commitments it would have been difficult
to argue that the companies would be bound by the pledges made
by the former right holders.
2. Other Theories and New Approaches
The many hurdles and uncertainties of the promissory estoppel
approach have prompted legal scholars to develop new theories on
how to enforce patent pledges. Jay Kesan and Carol Hayes have
107

Contreras, supra note 1, at 484.
Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s
Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain
Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. (Monday, Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-divisionits-decision-close-its-investigations.
108
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suggested conceptualizing patent pledges, in the framework of
FRAND commitments, according to the model of encumbrances
on real property, which would run with the patent in the case of a
patent transfer.109 Jorge Contreras has called for a “market reliance
theory for patent pledges” to overcome the difficulties of proving
actual reliance under promissory estoppel and to solve the transfer
problem.110 These new theories are thought provoking, but have not
yet been tested in court.
B. Germany
Although it is easier under German law than under U.S.
contract law to qualify a patent pledge as a contractual
arrangement, not all patent statements analyzed in this Article
fulfill all the necessary criteria for a binding contract in the sense
of sections 145 to 157 of the German Civil Code.111 However, this
does not imply that those non-contractual pledges are without legal
effect for other actors on the respective technology market.
German law provides legal principles for the construction of noncontractual, unilateral declarations on the use of intellectual
property that may help to clarify the possible legal consequences
for technology users relying on those pledges.
1. Unilateral Waiver
One possible strategy to give legal effect to a patent pledge not
qualifying as a bilateral contract could be to interpret the statement
as a waiver of the covered patents. A waiver is typically seen as a
unilateral declaration that relinquishes the covered right with in
rem effect.112 This strategy has been suggested in Germany for the
interpretation of unilateral statements with regards to the copyright
of a work, such as if the statement “reproduction permitted” is
printed on sheet music.113 In the context of copyright, the German
Federal Court has stated that copyright may not be waived entirely,
109

Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 294–304 (2014).
110
Contreras, supra note 1, at 538–57.
111
See supra Part II.B.
112
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 23, 1995, I ZR
68/93, GRUR 1995, 673, 675 Mauer-Bilder (Ger.).
113
Id.
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because it may also not be transferred according to Section 29 of
the German Copyright Act, but that a unilateral waiver is possible
for single economic rights—such as the right of distribution.114
However, such a waiver of single economic rights in favor of the
general public is not undisputed in copyright law literature, and a
number of authors regard it as invalid.115 In German patent law, it
has not been tested in court whether simple patent pledges could be
interpreted as declarations of patent waiver. Unlike copyrights,
patents may be transferred under German and European patent
law.116 The patent, or single patent claims,117 may also be the
subject of a waiver.118 But such a waiver must be submitted “by
written declaration to the Patent Office.”119 The requirements for a
written declaration in section 126 of the German Civil Code
demand that the document is signed by the issuer with his name in
his own hand, or by his notarially certified initials.120 This
requirement is not met by a simple public announcement.
Moreover, the German Federal Court has been strict with
interpretation of the requirement that the waiver must be declared
“to the Patent Office.”121 In the past, the court refused to give any
legal effect to a declaration of waiver expressed in a court
114

Id. In the case artists, who had painted pictures on the Berlin wall, claimed
for a share of the revenues from the later commercialization of the pieces of the
wall. The court denied a waiver of the right of distribution in the case. Id.
115
See, e.g., HAIMO SCHACK, URHEBER- UND URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT 181
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(6
ed. Tübingen 2015); THOMAS DREIER & GERNOTSCHULZE,
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ 334 (4th ed. Munich 2013). But see AXEL
NORDEMANN & JAN BERND NORDEMANN , URHEBERRECHT 555–56 (11th ed.
Stuttgart 2014); ULRICH LOEWENHEIM, URHEBERRECHT 625, (4th ed. Munich
2010).
116
See Patentgesetz [PatG]§ 15(1) (1981); Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, art. 71, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 276.
117
ALFONS SCHÄFERS, PATENTGESETZ 770, (Georg Benkard, ed.) (11th ed.
Munich 2015).
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See PatG § 20, European Patent Convention, art. 99, Rule 75 of the
Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents
of 5 October, 1973, as last amended by decision of the Administrative Council
of the European Patent Organization of 9 December, 2004.
119
PatG § 20.
120
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §126.
121
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 1, 1961, I ZR
131/56, GRUR 1962, 294 – Hafendrehkran (Ger.).
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settlement.122 Thus, a mere public statement in electronic form
cannot be constructed as a valid patent waiver.
2. Simple Consent
A VPP in a public announcement which does not constitute an
offer for a contract may still be characterized as simple consent to
the use of the covered technology.123 The German Federal Court
has recently applied this approach in the prominent copyright case
Vorschaubilder124 dealing with Google’s image search. According
to the Federal Court, Google’s use of copyright protected material
as thumbnails in its image search function is justified by the
implied consent of the concerned right holders.125 The court
inferred this implied consent from the fact that the right holders
made images available on the Internet without technological
measures to block the image search function. Such consent allows
the use of covered material but does not give any enforceable right
to the user.126 Also, the consent may be revoked prospectively at
any time, but not with retroactive effect.127 Since the simple
consent does not provide the user with any enforceable rights, it is
not required that the right holder declares the intention to be
bound.128
The Vorschaubilder decision has been harshly criticized by
commentators, especially for its ignorance of fundamental

122

Id.
On consent in German civil and intellectual property law see ANSGAR
OHLY, “VOLENTI NON FIT INIURIA”: DIE EINWILLIGUNG IM Privatrecht passim,
(Tübingen 2002).
124
Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 29, 2010, I ZR
69/08, GRUR 2010, 628 – Vorschaubilder (Ger.). See Matthias Leistner, The
German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment on Google’s Image Search – A
Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European Approach to Exceptions
and Limitations. INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND COMPETITION L. 42(4): 417–
442 (2011).
125
Id.
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I ZR 69/08, GRUR 2010, 628 at ¶ 34.
127
Id. at ¶ 37.
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Id. at ¶ 34.
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principles of civil law.129 One should therefore be careful and avoid
any hasty generalization. However, the case shows the potential of
the doctrine of consent for the “accepted use” of intellectual
property. If companies publish announcements like the above cited
statements of Tesla,130 such declarations may be interpreted as
simple consent in the use of the covered technology. Such a
characterization should even be allowed if the pledge is explicitly
drafted as “not legally binding,”131 because it belongs to the very
nature of a simple consent to be without any binding effect for the
future and to be revocable at any time. Nevertheless, patent holders
using those simple pledges should be barred from claiming
damages for the use of their patented technology in the past. As
long as simple consent has not been revoked, it precludes any
claim for patent infringement that has been committed in the
past.132 As a consequence, the principles of exhaustion should be
applicable to products manufactured by users relying on the patent
pledge. But the preclusion of claims comes to an end whenever the
pledge is revoked. Users should also be careful if the patent has
been transferred and the transferee has not announced whether the
pledge will be upheld or revoked. The simple consent has no in
rem effect and does not bind the transferee. Companies using
technology on the basis of a simple patent pledge bear considerable
economic risks. Any investment in products or services depending
on the protected technology may be jeopardized by the patent
holder after a revocation of the patent pledge.
3. Good Faith as Defense
Finally, if a public statement may neither be qualified as a
contract offer nor as simple consent, the defendant in a patent case
may still raise the general defense of “good faith” stated in section
242 of the German Civil Code.133 A patent holder declaring in
public that his patents will not be enforced but suing users of the
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MAR. 2016]

Non-Aggression Pledges and Innovation

511

patented technology behaves inconsistently. The defendant could
try to win the case on the basis of “venire contra factum proprium”
doctrine, a subcategory of the broader principle of good faith. The
“venire contra factum proprium”-doctrine has been applied by
German courts in many different areas.134 However, the court
practice in patent cases is meager.135 The few reported cases
concern situations in which the patent holder declared during
examination or opposition proceedings that he will not claim
certain varieties of a technology but later brought claims for
exactly those varieties against a defendant who relied on his
declaration. The application of the “venire contra factum
proprium”-doctrine in the case of a broken patent pledge has not
yet been tested in German courts. The probability of succeeding
with the defense is therefore hard to predict.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Voluntary Patent Pledges have become increasingly popular
over the last few years. Even though VPPs are made by different
means and with different strategic goals, they share that they are
drafted to encourage other companies and competitors to make
investments and to further innovate based upon the covered
technology. In that respect, patent pledges show great potential to
provide a new basis for innovation. However, companies and
individuals who take advantage of these pledges to facilitate
innovation do so in reliance on their enforceability. Thus, it is
critical that patent pledges are legally binding and enforceable. The
analysis provided above has shown that patent pledges can be
interpreted in different ways and—even more importantly—that
different national legal theories may result in different legal
effects.
While the U.S. analysis—especially recent U.S. case law—
suggests that patent pledges will be interpreted as patent licenses,
with all the legal consequences of such licenses, there is also room
134
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to argue that patent pledges are significantly different from
licenses, as they are defined as unilateral promises addressed to the
market in general and not to specifically identifiable parties.
Promissory estoppel may offer an alternative approach to tackle
patent pledges, but comes with additional concerns, including the
burden of proof and revocability. The German analysis also fails to
provide satisfactory legal certainty. Depending on the language,
patent pledges may be interpreted as patent license contracts, mere
procedural contracts, or simple consent with differing legal
consequences. In addition, the defendant may use arguments based
on good faith. Since the rule of territoriality can overrule some
aspects of commonly implemented choice-of-law clauses, any
future drafting of patent pledges and any use of pledged patents
should consider the international perspective.
Furthermore, future analysis should not only reflect commonly
known legal instruments, but also look carefully at the parties’ will
and the motivation behind a patent pledge. While the patent holder
may not be willing to enter a legally binding contract or license,
because of the known legal consequences, such as patent
exhaustion or the first sale doctrine, he may still want competitors
to use the technology and make investments. Pledge recipients may
want to enjoy the benefits of immediate access to technology
without lengthy and often costly license negotiations. Both
perspectives have a legitimate interest and must be brought into a
fair balance. Maximum flexibility for the pledgor will not always
meet the requirements and prospects of the pledge recipient.
With the current legal system not having a sensible solution or
suitable answer, it is even more important to further discuss and
engage in the use of patent pledges. Above all, they should not be
used as a tool to surpass and avoid commonly accepted and proven
legal instruments. Whenever the respective language of a patent
pledge shows clear indications and characteristics of a license, it
should be interpreted as such, even if packaged and labeled
differently. In other words, pure renaming of a license cannot
result in different legal consequences. Only in cases where the
language of the patent pledge clearly communicates different goals
and different envisaged legal results, and where these goals are
understandable and foreseeable for the pledge recipient, a fair
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balance between the interests of the respective pledgor and pledge
recipient can be assumed.
To conclude, voluntary patent pledges can provide a sound
basis for innovation if they are drafted accurately and in a way that
reflects the respective outward objective while clearly
communicating legal consequences. With significant legal and
economic risks for pledge recipients, it is critical to identify
mechanisms to hold pledging companies accountable. Otherwise,
the new patent panacea can easily backfire and hinder innovation
instead of supporting it. Transparency and further legal analysis
accompanied by a better informed public discussion around patent
pledges seem inevitable to provide legal certainty for pledge
recipients. This is especially true in order to understand the
potential impact of unmet promises and pledges on innovation,
competitiveness, vendor margins and ultimate costs to society.
From a legal perspective, one way to enhance legal certainty
could be the development of certain procedures when
communicating patent pledges or using pledged patents. Where
patent pledges may lead to promissory estoppel or may be
interpreted as simple consent, clear guidelines could help to
understand the requirements for effective revocation. A step-bystep procedure ranging from the publication of the revocation in a
comprehensible manner to a grace period and a final notice to the
pledge recipient before filing infringement claims would make the
use of pledged patents more predictable and economic risks
calculable. Concurrently, there is room to build best practices for
pledge recipients, such as required research of patents and related
pledges in the field of targeted technologies or other duties to
exercise due care and collect sufficient information before using
pledged technology.
From a political perspective, the growing popularity of patent
pledges should not only pose the question of how to qualify patent
pledges under the current legal system and provide legal certainty,
but also the question for patent reform. Patent trolls are only one
recent phenomenon to demonstrate that patents are used in many
different ways and that the long known theory whereby patents
create incentives to invent in the first place may be in need of
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revision. After years of “patent wars” and with all the money spent
on legal disputes, patent pledges can open the stage for a
constructive debate about new ways for companies to make use of
their inventions instead of blocking each other.

